

The Australian case illustrates how such a coalition can be formed. In Australia, Catholics became fully incorporated into the national political system because they were embedded in the Labor Party's coalition, which forged an identity rooted in class. Australia, however, also illustrates how political incorporation is refracted through the unique characteristics of each nation. It did not have deep regional divides, thus enabling a nationwide labor movement. Its rate of unionization was comparatively high, which fostered a "big tent" Labor Party. And compulsory voter turnout prevented any efforts to keep Catholics from the polls. In combination, these conditions created a coalition of the working class that transcended any religious differences.

As is so often the case in the United States, Gin argues that the impediment to a comparable reconstructive coalition was race or, specifically, Southern Democrats' desire to maintain Jim Crow in the former Confederacy. Once *de jure* segregation ended, the door opened for Southerners to join with culturally conservative Catholics—forging a common identity rooted in a defense of traditional values, such as opposition to abortion and LGBTQ rights. Today, some of the fiercest culture warriors in the Religious Right are Catholics, such as Rick Santorum and Newt Gingrich. Meanwhile, liberal Catholics found a place in the Democratic coalition, not because they are Catholics, but because of their identity as liberals. Thus, John Kerry was the party's presidential nominee in 2004, and Joe Biden served two terms as vice president. In perhaps the most telling example of Catholics' successful incorporation into US politics, liberal Catholics often take heat from conservative *Protestants* for not being "Catholic enough"—for supporting abortion rights and same-sex marriage.

Meanwhile, as is so often the case in Canada, Gin argues that the obstacle to full Catholic incorporation was the nation's deep regional divisions, particularly between Quebec and the rest of the country. Perhaps ironically, he notes, the fact that Catholics are a larger share of the population in Canada (40%) than in either Australia or the United States impeded their full incorporation, even though individual Catholics were able to be elected prime minister. As the majority in Quebec, Catholics could wield considerable power in *la belle province*. They also had a critical mass in other provinces, making them an important voting bloc. In the past, then, provincialism delayed a pan-Canadian reconstructive coalition. Today, however, Catholics are fully part of the Liberal Party's coalition; both Justin Trudeau and his father Pierre are exemplars of center-left Quebecers who, although nominally Catholic, are better described as products of a secularized Quebec. Trudeau *père* decriminalized homosexuality and abortion; Trudeau *fil* is staunchly pro-choice and marches in Pride parades. In this way, liberal Catholics in Canada are much like their American

counterparts. Yet unlike in the United States, conservative Protestants and Catholics in Canada have not formed an alliance in the culture war: the Religious Right has never found much traction north of the 49th parallel.

Obviously, these arguments make Gin's book a deep dive into the differing trajectories of Catholics in these three nations. Yet for all that this book can teach us about the specific case of Catholics, it is just as valuable as a lens to understand the political incorporation of many other minority groups—whether religious, ethnic, or racial. And even though it focuses on Australia, Canada, and the United States, I would venture to say that the idea of reconstructive coalitions travels well. I encourage future scholars to put it to the test for other groups in other contexts.

Finally, there is still another lesson in this book, particularly for US readers. I fear Americanists often take "American exceptionalism" too literally, and fail to appreciate what can be learned by comparing the United States to other nations. Here we have an excellent example of how both Canada and Australia make for fruitful comparisons with the United States. All three nations are geographically large and resource-rich, born of British roots but with a federal system of governance (not to mention that, regrettably, they also share the historic mistreatment of indigenous peoples). I have long been puzzled why more Americanists do not look North or South to better understand what is exceptional about the United States and what is not. Gin's book is an excellent example of what can be gained from truly comparative research. The study of Catholics' political incorporation is only the beginning.

**Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective.** Edited by Noam Lupu, Virginia Oliveros, and Luis Schiumerini. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019. 304p. \$80.00 cloth.  
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*Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* is an essential book in understanding voters' choices, political elites' behavior, and political parties in contemporary Argentina. The book makes three important contributions. First, it is one of the only volumes that departs from the assumption that the factors that drive voter behavior in advanced democracies also determine voters' choice in developing democracies (see also Ryan Carlin, Matthew Singer, and Elizabeth Zechmeister's, *The Latin American Voter*, 2015). The editors Noam Lupu, Virginia Oliveros, and Luis Schiumerini argue that the prevailing context of developing democracies—marked by a weak civil society, high levels of poverty and inequality, weak political parties and

partisan attachments, and clientelism—leads to a different type of voter behavior from the one observed in advanced democracies. More specifically, the editors argue that in developing democracies, where few social identity groups are politically salient (due to a weak civil society) and partisan attachments are sparse (due, among other reasons, to the fleeting nature of political parties and their incapacity to ideologically distinguish themselves), voters place more weight on issue voting. They further assert that where policy issues are largely absent from political discourse, as is the case in most developing democracies, valence considerations and campaign effects play a larger role.

Drawing on the case of Argentina, the editors and contributors to the volume test empirically some aspect of this argument in each of the individual chapters. Taken together, the chapters reveal that voters in developing democracies are driven on election day by a different set of considerations than their US and Western European counterparts. By showing that this is the case, the book challenges the often assumed generalizability of a well-established theory of voting that draws its central premises on developed democratic systems. The book thus sets a new research agenda that emphasizes the need to build distinct theories of voting behavior for developing versus advanced democracies.

The richness of the empirical analysis is the second main contribution of *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies*. The book is the first to test hypotheses using a one-of-a-kind survey, the Argentine Panel Election Studies (APES). The APES is both the first academic panel survey and the first election study ever conducted in Argentina. It was fielded during the 2015 presidential election and consisted of two face-to-face waves of interviews, one before the election and the other after it. The two waves helped trace the attitudes and preferences of the same individuals over time, thus allowing the contributors of the volume to test whether political, institutional, or attitudinal variables affect changes in vote intentions within the same individual longitudinally. By so doing, the contributors to the volume are well equipped to identify the causal mechanisms of those changes along the electoral cycle. The APES stands out not only because of its comprehensive temporal coverage and number of observations but also because of its cross-country research implications for studies of voter behavior. With the exceptions of Brazil and Mexico, Latin American countries are notorious for not fielding this type of panel election study. For the first time, the APES allows scholars of Latin America to make comparisons of voter behavior across the three largest democracies in this region. Two of the chapters in this book, those by Kenneth Greene and by Andy Baker and Dalton Dorr, are the first analyses of panel election data ever to be conducted comparing Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Its comparative scope is the third contribution of the book, and yet it might strike some readers as the least developed of the three. Taken together, the majority of the chapters rarely discuss the implications of their findings for the broader understanding of voter behavior in developing democracies. Moreover, the few chapters that explicitly engage in a cross-national analysis deal for the most part with descriptive comparisons about voter responses and electoral behavior, rather than with causal analysis, and they do not always leverage the comparative method to test hypotheses and draw causal inferences across countries. As a result, the reader can learn about the similarities and differences of voting behavior across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico but cannot discern a generalizable theory that explains why voters in these three countries voted following a similar or dissimilar pattern.

So how did the Argentine electorate vote in 2015 when the center-right candidate, Mauricio Macri, defeated the center-left incumbent party led by Daniel Scioli? Building on the APES, the chapters in *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies* tell us that valence considerations—that is, how incumbents performed—figured prominently among voters. General and particular economic considerations were critical influences on the vote (as shown in chapters written by María Victoria Murillo and Steven Levitsky; Lupo; Carlos Gervasoni and María Laura Tagina; and Schiumerini). There is an unequivocal consensus that Daniel Scioli lost the election because of the bad economic performance of his incumbent party. With regard to policy position, the chapters by Lupo and by Gervasoni and Tagina, find that policy preferences did not matter. With the exception of Greene's chapter, there is agreement that Argentine voters did not vote for Macri or against Scioli based on their partisan platforms. Instead, weak partisan attachment allowed portions of the electorate to switch loyalties across the course of the campaign, as clearly demonstrated in the chapters by Ernesto Calvo and by Baker and Dorr; this weak attachment facilitated modest levels of strategic voting (chapter by Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew Winters). Yet, campaign effects, as formidably shown by Greene, were substantial in Argentina. In fact, they were decisive: Greene finds that, were it not for the campaign, Scioli would have won the election. With a very innovative set of questions and strong causal inferential analysis, Oliveros' chapter demonstrates that a sizable portion of the Argentine electorate distrusted the integrity of the election process. The mistrust was mainly triggered by suspicions of rampant vote buying. Finally, Zechmeister concludes the volume with a chapter that shows that individual-level cross-election volatility levels are higher in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, than in the United States.

These findings of how Argentine voters behaved in 2015 are important not only because they reveal that vote choice in developing democracies differs from that

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in developed democracies, but also because they turn on its head classic findings of voting behavior in Argentina (see Mora y Aurajo y Llorente's *El Voto Peronista*, 1975). In so doing the book shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, voters in contemporary Argentina no longer cast their votes based on partisan affiliations or positional issues; instead they do so mostly based on valence issues.

**A Political Economy of the United States, China, and India: Prosperity with Inequality.** By Shalendra D. Sharma.

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After a relative period of neglect, the subject of economic inequality has attained significant prominence in social science research, at least since the early 2000s. Among the major works that have addressed the issue since then, Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty First Century* (2013) has certainly been one of the most quoted (or alluded to); indeed, it has reached a level of popular acclaim or at least recognition that is unmatched by most other academic titles of its kind. One interpretation of Piketty's central point—that inequality results when, in the long run, the average rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate—is that this phenomenon is inherent in capitalism. Joseph Stiglitz ("Inequality is Not Inevitable," *New York Times*, June 29, 2014), among others, has criticized this interpretation. Shalendra Sharma's *A Political Economy of the United States, China, and India* likewise interprets Piketty's argument as positing the inevitability of this outcome under a capitalist system. And Sharma—again, much as Stiglitz and others do—points out that inequality, rather than being inevitable, is a result of policy choices, which in turn are quintessentially political outcomes.

The book does not have an overarching argument or a theoretical framework about the causes of inequality. Rather, it summarizes research on the determinants of inequality in each of the three countries in its title. Thus, for instance, chapter 2 on the United States, recapitulates research in political science and economics—including work by Raj Chetty and colleagues, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, and Nicholas Carnes—on the determinants of economic inequality. Chapters 3 and 4 continue in a similar vein, summarizing research on this topic relevant to China and India, respectively. The surveys are generally organized under (the mutually nonexclusive) categories of "politics" or "political economy" and "globalization," with the former focusing on the domestic political sources of inequality and the latter on the dynamics of global trade

and finance that also tend to have an effect on inequality. Although the lack of a theoretical framework leads to one obvious weakness—there is no theoretical justification for the selection of the three cases (beyond the practical or pragmatic one of examining inequality in three politically and economically important countries)—such an approach also has its advantages. The literature covered is quite comprehensive, and the asides on the politics of interstate trade and finance (especially between China and the United States) are obviously of great interest. As such, this book would be valuable to anybody seeking an introduction to the recent debate on economic inequality.

Sharma makes sure that all sides of the debate get a fair hearing. He includes thinkers who argue either that inequality is not the problem it is made out to be (because, *inter alia*, personal well-being has improved greatly) or that it is not as severe as some of the data might lead one to believe. Sharma also considers the views of those who claim that redistribution to equalize wealth and income would be either impractical or unjust (pp. 154–55). He points out, for instance, that those making more than one million dollars in the United States (comprising 0.3% of all tax returns) contribute 27% of total revenues (p. 45). This, however, should not be too surprising given progressive taxation and high levels of income inequality. Comparable figures from some of the other OECD countries (which are not provided) would perhaps have helped better make at least part of the case—presumably that higher shares in government revenues somehow compensate for inequality or inequality is an inevitable (or just?) price to pay for higher government revenues.

Part of Thomas Piketty's argument, however, is also about politics. His work can be seen as providing, in Stiglitz's words, "an institutional context for understanding the deepening of inequality over time" ("Inequality Is Not Inevitable"). Sharma briefly notes something similar when he quotes Piketty as acknowledging the political nature of economic inequality (p. 10), but then accuses him of disregarding his own advice not to reduce everything to "purely economic mechanisms" (p. 10). Yet Piketty's economic mechanisms are themselves replete with politics. To take just one example, his explanation of how low inflation throughout the nineteenth century, combined with regular interest payments by governments (principally in Britain and France) on their huge public debts, essentially redistributed wealth upward (*Capital in the Twenty First Century*, pp. 126–34) implies some fundamentally political calculations on the part of policy makers. Perhaps the central problem is the very distinction between "political" and "economic" mechanisms. Sharma briefly references Polanyi to make the point that the market is fundamentally political in nature (p. 11), but then subsequently reverts to the distinction between economic and political causes of inequality. He argues, for instance, that the political prerogatives of the