"Credit Claiming by Labeling"
Comparative Political Studies

Virginia Oliveros, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Matthew S. Winters

Online Appendix

Table A1: Sample Characteristics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	National Population Mean
age	1,802	39.9	16.0	16	87	41.9 (among 16+)
female	1,802	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.52
poor (social class = D1, D2, or E)	1,802	0.43	0.49	0	1	0.44
from the city or province of Buenos Aires	1,802	0.43	0.50	0	1	0.43
household head education	1,802	6.4	2.0	1	10	

National population statistics come from the 2010 National Census (age) (https://censo.gob.ar/, accessed 25 February 2023); the 2022 National Census (female, from the city/province of Buenos Aires) (https://censo.gob.ar/, accessed 25 February 2023); and the Sociedad Argentina de Investigadores de Marketing y Opinión (2021 first trimester, https://www.saimo.org.ar/archivos/2022/proyecto-2021-nse-en-pandemia-saimo-ceim.pdf, accessed 25 February 2023). We could not identify population-level data on household head education level.

Table A2: Respondents' assessments of the program, the mayor who implements it, and voting behavior by labeling treatment (dichotomized outcomes)

How likely do you think it is that…	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	…the food program was the mayor's idea?	… the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	…there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	…you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	…you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	…the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	…the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	… the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	…the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	…the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Not labeled	0.53	0.31	0.92	0.38	0.32	0.33	0.23	0.80	0.85	0.85
Labeled	0.51	0.29	0.92	0.33	0.27	0.31	0.20	0.81	0.83	0.87
Difference	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	1,802	1,802	1,802	1,801	1,800	1,802	1,801	1,801	1,798	1,797

Note: Average treatment effects calculated as the difference between the treatment and the control group (*t-test* with unequal variance) for proportion giving "very likely" and "likely" responses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A3: Respondents' assessments of the program, the mayor who implements it, and voting behavior by labeling treatment (complier average causal effects)

How likely do you think it is that…	1 …the food program was the mayor's idea?	2 … the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	3 …there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	4 …you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	5 …you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	6 …the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	7 …the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	8 … the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	9 …the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	10 …the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Labeled	-0.15	-0.13	0.042	-0.24*	-0.10	-0.098	-0.033	0.099	-0.027	0.21**
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.090)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	2.57***	2.15***	3.62***	2.19***	1.97***	2.15***	1.90***	3.36***	3.33***	3.28***
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.028)
N	1802	1802	1802	1801	1800	1802	1801	1801	1798	1797

Note: Complier average causal effects calculated using a two-stage least squares regression in which correctly answering a manipulation check question about seeing the mayor's name on the box serves as a first-stage instrument for the labeling treatment. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A4: Treatment Effects of Labeling on Questions about Perceptions of Labeling

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	On a scale from 0 to 10, the fact that the mayor places his/her name on the box of food is something that you would consider…		
	Common	Ethical	Important
labeled with name	0.62***	-0.14	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.29)
biased	0.11	-0.20	0.19
	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.29)
unbiased	0.16	0.0042	-0.070
	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.28)
biased*labeled	-0.16	0.095	-0.58
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.40)
unbiased*labeled	-0.23	0.031	-0.38
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.40)
constant	7.31***	2.03***	3.92***
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.20)
N	1802	1802	1802
adj. R-sq	0.005	-0.001	-0.000

Note: Linear regression model with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A5: Treatment Effects of Information about Biased and Unbiased Distribution

How likely do you think it is that…	(1) …the food program was the mayor's idea?	(2) … the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	(3) …there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	(4) …you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	(5) …you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	(6) …the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	(7) …the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	(8) … the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	(9) …the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	(10) …the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Biased	0.022	-0.094*	0.0098	-0.13**	-0.094*	0.019	-0.027	-0.032	0.025	0.026
	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Unbiased	-0.041	0.019	-0.042	0.21***	0.14***	0.078	0.017	-0.070	-0.060	-0.062
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Copartisan Match	0.18***	0.31***	-0.35***	0.41***	0.51***	0.51***	0.36***	-0.13**	-0.45***	-0.44***
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Constant	2.51***	2.08***	3.71***	2.02***	1.83***	1.99***	1.82***	3.45***	3.44***	3.43***
	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.034)
N	1742	1742	1742	1742	1741	1742	1741	1741	1740	1739
adj. R-sq	0.005	0.023	0.043	0.044	0.056	0.047	0.032	0.002	0.050	0.052

Note: Linear regression model with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. The baseline condition includes no information about distribution. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A6: Respondents' assessments of the program, the mayor who implements it, and voting behavior by labeling treatment (complier average causal effects among respondents assigned to receive no implementation information)

How likely do you think it is that…	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	…the food program was the mayor's idea?	… the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	…there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	…you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	…you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	…the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	…the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	… the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	…the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	…the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Labeled	-0.41*	0.033	-0.0014	0.031	0.22	0.23	0.19	0.12	-0.12	0.16
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Constant	2.63***	2.14***	3.64***	2.10***	1.88***	2.05***	1.86***	3.40***	3.37***	3.31***
	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.048)
N	604	604	604	604	604	604	604	604	603	601

Note: Complier average causal effects calculated using a two-stage least squares regression in which correctly answering a manipulation check question about seeing the mayor's name on the box serves as a first-stage instrument for the labeling treatment. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table A7: Respondents' assessments of the program, the mayor who implements it, and voting behavior by labeling treatment (complier average causal effects among respondents assigned to receive unbiased implementation information)

How likely do you think it is that…	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	…the food program was the mayor's idea?	… the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	…there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	…you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	…you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	…the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	…the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	… the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	…the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	…the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Labeled	-0.045	-0.19	0.022	-0.70***	-0.53**	-0.57**	-0.039	-0.067	-0.12	0.37*
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Constant	2.52***	2.20***	3.59***	2.47***	2.18***	2.30***	1.92***	3.36***	3.31***	3.20***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.052)
N	615	615	615	614	613	615	615	615	614	614

Note: Complier average causal effects calculated using a two-stage least squares regression in which correctly answering a manipulation check question about seeing the mayor's name on the box serves as a first-stage instrument for the labeling treatment. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

Table A8: Respondents' assessments of the program, the mayor who implements it, and voting behavior by labeling treatment (complier average causal effects among respondents assigned to receive biased implementation information)

How likely do you think it is that…	1 …the food program was the mayor's idea?	2 … the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	3 …there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	4 …you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	5 …you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	6 …the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	7 …the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	8 … the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	9 …the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	10 …the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
Labeled	0.058	-0.29	0.12	-0.15	-0.080	-0.0037	-0.30	0.27	0.19	0.12
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Constant	2.56***	2.10***	3.61***	2.01***	1.87***	2.13***	1.93***	3.34***	3.33***	3.33***
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.046)
N	583	583	583	583	583	583	582	582	581	582

Note: Complier average causal effects calculated using a two-stage least squares regression in which correctly answering a manipulation check question about seeing the mayor's name on the box serves as a first-stage instrument for the labeling treatment. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

Partisanship as a Moderator of Labeling

The null effects that we report in Tables 2 and 3 in the main text may obscure different reactions between individuals who share a partisan identity with the mayor and those who do not. As shown in those tables, copartisanship with the mayor named in the vignette is a powerful predictor of responses to the outcome questions. It is possible to imagine that copartisans and non-copartisans may react in different ways to the labeling treatment. For instance, copartisans may treat labeling as a signal of a competent mayor who cares about the poor, whereas non-copartisans may be more inclined to think of the labeling as political opportunism and therefore to react negatively to it.

Tables A9 and A10 below do not provide much evidence to suggest consistent partisan differences. In columns 1a and 1b, there are a set of unexpected patterns. For copartisans, we see no significant reactions to any of the treatments. Among other respondents, we see that the labeling treatment (in the absence of implementation information) and both implementation treatments (in the absence of the label) reduce respondents' likelihood of saying that the mayor had the idea for the food program. When the labeling treatment and either type of implementing information are present, these negative effects are offset somewhat. It is hard to understand why these patterns might appear among non-copartisans.

In columns 4a and 4b and 5a and 5b, we see patterns similar to Table 3 among both the copartisan and non-copartisan groups. For both the question about satisfaction with the program and voting for the mayor, among copartisans, there is some gain that comes from the unbiased information treatment that is offset in the presence of labeling. The interaction term is not significant in any of these cases, however.

9

In Table A10, this pattern of increasingly positive impressions from the unbiased distribution treatment that are offset by the labeling treatment is also present in column 6a, although the estimates remain imprecise. Elsewhere in Table A10, we find few consistent patterns. While copartisanship is a clear predictor of positive attitudes towards that mayor, these tables do not offer much evidence that copartisanship moderates how respondents react to the treatments on labeling or the fairness of distribution.

Table A9: Respondents' assessments of the program and voting behavior by labeling treatment and program implementation, partisan subgroups

	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)	(4a)	(4b)	(5a)	(5b)
	Program was mayor's idea		Distribution is unbiased		Corruption in program purchases		Satisfaction with program		Vote for the mayor	
	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others
labeled with name	0.15	-0.37***	0.034	0.043	-0.10	-0.0086	0.10	-0.10	0.19	0.028
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.067)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.10)
biased	0.20	-0.24**	-0.062	-0.052	-0.066	-0.040	-0.052	-0.16	-0.031	0.055
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.099)	(0.14)	(0.071)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.10)
unbiased	0.034	-0.32**	0.018	0.10	-0.098	-0.038	0.44**	0.21	0.34**	0.23**
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.075)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.11)
biased*labeled	-0.13	0.36**	-0.069	-0.065	0.0029	0.011	-0.27	0.12	-0.13	-0.030
	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.15)
unbiased*labeled	-0.058	0.31*	0.018	-0.14	0.0046	-0.021	-0.37	-0.099	-0.24	-0.12
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.15)
Constant	2.56***	2.73***	2.37***	2.04***	3.46***	3.74***	2.39***	1.98***	2.22***	1.69***
	(0.12)	(0.087)	(0.11)	(0.074)	(0.098)	(0.047)	(0.13)	(0.086)	(0.12)	(0.071)
Observations	375	804	375	804	375	804	375	804	375	803
R-squared	-0.005	0.010	-0.010	-0.001	-0.007	-0.005	0.024	0.011	0.010	0.001

Note: Linear regression model with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. $*p<0.10$, $**p<0.05$, $***p<0.01$.

Table A10: Respondents' assessments of the mayor by labeling treatment and program implementation, partisan subgroups

	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)	(4a)	(4b)	(5a)	(5b)
	Mayor is pro-poor		Mayor chooses policies that benefit respondent		Mayor hires friends and family		Mayor buys votes		Mayor engages in corruption	
	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others	Copartisans	Others
labeled with name	0.27	0.040	0.25*	0.028	-0.068	-0.0071	-0.25	-0.049	-0.10	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.090)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.091)	(0.15)	(0.091)
biased	0.22	0.071	0.11	0.10	-0.26	-0.066	-0.085	-0.055	-0.19	0.094
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.087)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.090)	(0.15)	(0.084)
unbiased	0.24	0.25**	0.022	0.12	-0.063	-0.026	-0.13	-0.013	-0.26	0.0056
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.095)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.091)	(0.16)	(0.094)
biased*labeled	-0.19	-0.028	-0.41*	-0.072	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.15	-0.13
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.12)
unbiased*labeled	-0.34	-0.24	-0.26	0.011	0.0027	-0.034	0.38	-0.12	0.26	-0.073
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.13)
Constant	2.34***	1.87***	2.12***	1.69***	3.41***	3.39***	3.08***	3.49***	3.12***	3.39***
	(0.12)	(0.076)	(0.11)	(0.061)	(0.12)	(0.081)	(0.12)	(0.063)	(0.11)	(0.063)
Observations	375	804	374	804	374	804	374	803	374	803
R-squared	-0.003	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005	0.003	-0.005	-0.003

Note: Linear regression model with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Results across AUH Beneficiaries and Other Respondents

Table A11: Respondents' assessments of the program and the mayor who implements it and their likely voting behavior by labeling treatment (AUH beneficiaries vs. non-AUH beneficiaries)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
					How likely do you think is it that…					
	…the food program was the mayor's idea?	… the boxes of food will be distributed to those who really need it?	…there will be corruption in the purchase of food for this program?	…you would be satisfied with a program like this one…?	…you would vote for the mayor in the next election?	…the mayor will govern on behalf of the poor?	…the mayor will implement policies that benefit people like you?	… the mayor has given a job in the municipality to a friend or relative?	…the mayor will buy votes to get reelected?	…the mayor has been involved in some corrupt activity in the past?
AUH Beneficiaries										
Not Labeled	2.54	2.30	3.51	2.32	2.20	2.41	2.15	3.27	3.28	3.22
Labeled	2.38	2.14	3.58	2.32	2.09	2.23	2.10	3.20	3.28	3.37
Difference	-0.16	-0.16	0.07	0.00	-0.11	-0.18	-0.05	-0.07	-0.01	0.15
N	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259	259
Non-AUH Beneficiaries										
Not Labeled	2.58	2.12	3.64	2.17	1.93	2.11	1.85	3.39	3.35	3.30
Labeled	2.53	2.09	3.64	2.06	1.91	2.09	1.85	3.44	3.33	3.36
Difference	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	-0.11**	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.06	-0.01	0.06
N	1,499	1,499	1,499	1,498	1,497	1,499	1,498	1,498	1,497	1,494

Note: Average treatment effects calculated as the difference in means between the labeled and not-labeled groups. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. The top panel includes respondents who self-identified as recipients of Argentina's Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (Asignación Universal por Hijo, AUH); the bottom panel includes all other respondents. Significance levels based on t-tests with unequal variance. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A12: Respondents' assessments of the program and voting behavior by labeling treatment and mode of program distribution (AUH recipients only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Program was mayor's idea	Distribution is unbiased	Corruption in program purchases	Satisfaction with program	Vote for the mayor	Mayor is pro-poor	Mayor chooses policies that benefit respondent	Mayor hires friends and family	Mayor buys votes	Mayor engages in corruption
labeled with name	-0.18	-0.037	0.11	0.19	0.12	0.094	0.078	0.21	0.21	0.37**
	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.17)
biased	0.14	0.29*	-0.063	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.32*	-0.25	-0.035	0.080
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.18)
unbiased	-0.11	0.38**	-0.28	0.60**	0.34*	0.54**	0.082	-0.13	-0.31	-0.16
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)
biased*labeled	-0.080	-0.10	-0.20	-0.18	-0.36	-0.094	-0.28	-0.24	-0.31	-0.42*
	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.24)
unbiased*labeled	0.17	-0.26	0.090	-0.37	-0.34	-0.77**	-0.056	-0.64**	-0.29	-0.22
	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.27)
copartisan match	0.30**	0.083	-0.25*	0.074	0.19	0.25	0.23*	-0.26	-0.14	-0.33**
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
constant	2.46***	2.06***	3.66***	2.01***	1.97***	2.13***	1.96***	3.46***	3.41***	3.29***
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Observations	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	258	258
R-squared	0.002	0.007	0.021	0.008	-0.000	0.030	0.006	0.032	0.034	0.038

Note: Linear regression models with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. Results based on respondents who self-identified as recipients of Argentina's Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (Asignación Universal por Hijo, AUH). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A13: Respondents' assessments of the program and voting behavior by labeling treatment and mode of program distribution (Non-AUH recipients only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Program was mayor's idea	Distribution is unbiased	Corruption in program purchases	Satisfaction with program	Vote for the mayor	Mayor is pro-poor	Mayor chooses policies that benefit respondent	Mayor hires friends and family	Mayor buys votes	Mayor engages in corruption
labeled with name	-0.18**	0.012	-0.015	-0.032	0.082	0.072	0.052	0.012	-0.11	-0.0048
	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.057)	(0.091)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.070)	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.070)
biased	-0.13	-0.13*	0.032	-0.20**	-0.13	0.00062	-0.035	-0.015	-0.014	0.051
	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.068)
unbiased	-0.13	0.0030	-0.011	0.30***	0.27***	0.16*	0.040	-0.031	-0.035	-0.089
	(0.088)	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.071)
biased*labeled	0.27**	-0.074	0.031	0.026	-0.013	-0.030	-0.084	0.085	0.16	0.015
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.082)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.096)
unbiased*labeled	0.19	-0.036	-0.00055	-0.24*	-0.27**	-0.18	-0.060	0.045	0.081	0.12
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.082)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.098)
copartisan match	0.16***	0.34***	-0.36***	0.47***	0.56***	0.55***	0.39***	-0.11*	-0.50***	-0.45***
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.052)
constant	2.62***	2.09***	3.72***	2.03***	1.76***	1.93***	1.76***	3.43***	3.48***	3.42***
	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Observations	1479	1479	1479	1479	1478	1479	1478	1478	1478	1476
R-squared	0.004	0.030	0.047	0.059	0.072	0.055	0.038	-0.000	0.062	0.057

Note: Linear regression models with HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. Respondents who did not see the image are excluded. Results based on respondents who did not self-identify as recipients of Argentina's Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (Asignación Universal por Hijo, AUH). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.